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I ntroduc tion 
Writing of the relationship between the Fabian. Colonial Bureau and the Colonial Office 
under the Labour Govement of 1945-51, Margaret Cole claimed that "its influence had. 
played no small part in fonailating policy which was actualv carried out" (l), while 
Goldsworthy has written that "here was one of %he most remarkable instances of 
sustained and creative interchange between a minister a d  a prt?ssm gxoup which 
recent political history is able to providet1. (2) 
In this paper I shall argue that, while Goldsworthycs statement holds true 
where the Colonial Office is concerned, writers on the Bureau have underestimated the 
fact that when Fabian plans conflicted with government priorities, as frequently they 
did, they were overruled. I shall attempt to illustrate this throw an examination 
of the Bureau@s activities on South Africa between 1940 and 1955. Rere, during the 
Attlee government, they came up against a markedly less spnpathetic response, 
reflecting a government policy of maintaining good relations with South Africa. 
Fail- here also serves to throw the B m a u ~ s  tactics and philosophy into somewhat 
sharper ligbt than a study of the Colonial Office only. 
Between 1940 and 1955 perspectives on South Africa in Britain underwent 
rapid change, and a study of the Bureaufs activities serves also to illustrate this 
process. Before 1950 they were almost the only gsoup on the left concerned w i t h  
African issues. Thereafter, the Bureau's importance declined as other  TOU UPS (which 
gained much of their impetus from events in southern ~frica) took the centre of the 
stage with new policies and methods to which the Fabians sometimes found it hard to 
adapt. 
The Bureau, 1940-45 
The origins of the Fabian Colonial B m a u  were closely connected with South 
Africa. The Labour Party had never devoted my serious attention to qtThe Ehpiret1, but 
in the 1930s two small groups, with an overlapping membership, functioned as pressure 
and study groups on race relations in Africa. The "Friends of Africa" had been set up 
by Winifred Holtby aYld Arthw: Creech Jones to support the activities of William 
Ballinger, researcher and trade union activist in South Africa who had originally been 
sent out by them to aid Kadalie's Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union in 1928. 
The nembership of this group overlapped with Frederick Livie-Noblefs llLondon Group on 
African Affairs19,set up to study race relations m d  the Empire in 1930 at the 
suggestion of Rheinallt Jones of the South African Institute of Race Relations. Both 
groupsf activities centred on South Africa znd the three British-ruled Protectorates. 
In 1940 both ceased to function owing to wartime pressures, but in the same 
year some of their Labour Party activists formed the Fabian Colonial Bureau. For some 
time the need had been felt for an organization which could engage in co-ordinated 
research and activity on colonial issues, while it was felt that continued activity 
on South Africa was less worthwhile owing to that cowtryfs independence from British 
control. (3) The initiative was taken by the South African-born Rita Hinden, who 
gained the support of the Fabian Society for the establishment of a Colonial Bureau 
whose main task would be to formulate colonial policy for a post-war Labour government. 
The Bureau started, with very limited personnel and resources, in October 
1940. Its perspective fell within the Fabian tradition of empirical research into 
specific problems, through information gained mainly through official sources and 
through correspondents, mainly "white liberal1' contacts in the Empire. They 
maintained the common view that African colonies would not be ready for independence 
until many years of training had passed, and held a strong hostility towards Marxism 
and radical African nationalism. 
From 1940 until 1945, the Bureau's main work was in producing a series of 
l1general" pamphlets on colonial problems. Secondly, they built up links with a11 
interested Labour MPS, and a wide network was created. Questions in Parliament were 
used to gather information and also kept Ministers on their toes. By 1945 the Bureau 
had grown to the stage where it was the immediate source of reference for all those 
concerned with Ehpire matters in the Party. (4) This process of influencing the party 
through I1expertI1 advice reminds one in some ways of the tactics of "perneation" of 
political parties advocated for the Fabians by the Webbs in the early years of the 
century. The type of "permeationf1 employed by the FCB, however, was very different - 
theoretical, not organizational. It relied on persuasion of those responsible for 
formulating party policy - and was based on the premise that they would listen. 
The Bureau and South Africa, 1940-45 
The Bureau's first Chairman and Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones and Rita 
Hinden, already had regular contacts with South Africa, with the Ballingers and with 
the Institute of Race Relations. There was, also, a "Cape Fabian Society" which, in 
the 1 9 4 0 ~ ~  initiated a correspondence with the London Buseau. Asked by Winden to 
outline their policy on race, their secretary replied: "Politics in this country is 
based mainly upon a racial struggle ... I have alwa3.s advocated that the Cape Fabian 
Society should endeavour to alter this and put politics on a social and economic 
basis rather than the present racial one." (5) 
This view of race prejudice as an aberration produced by the peculiar 
historical development of South Africa which must pass away as the country developed 
economically, a view divorced from any analysis of the workings of a capitalist 
econorqy based largely on cheap labour, was the typical ideology of liberal groups in 
the 1940s in South Africa. The Fabians' other contacts also held during the war 
years that the advance of industrialism would break down racial barriers. In 1942, 
after Smutsls statement that racial discrimination in South Africa would be b r o w t  
to an end, the Institute of Race Relations wrote to Rita Hinden expressing great 
optimism, a view with which Hinden agreed. (6) 
This optimism did not blind the Bureau to the importance for Africa of South 
African developments, but, despite their antecedents and contacts, they firmly 
maintained their resolve not to become closely involved with the self-governing 
Dominions. In 1942 Hinden wrote to one correspondent who had asked for help and 
advice: IYour problems in South Africa have to be tackled on the spot together with 
like-minded persons around you. We in England have no control or responsibility for 
affairs in the Union, and all we can do is to spread some of the more liberal 
ideas . . . (7) 
After 1945, however, the Fabians did become more closely involved with South 
Africa, for two reasons. Firstly, a whole series of issues arose affecting not only 
South Africa but also her nei&bours - Southern Rhodesia, South-West Africa and the 
three "Protectorates1'. These were territories which the Fabians felt E within their 
purview. Secondly, after 1945 the optinism of the war years regarding South African 
development collapsed, with the strong post-war w e s t  and its repression by %nuts, 
and then in 1948, with the victory of lhlan. "Apartheidt1 threw down a gauntlet to 
liberalism and quickly became a focus of world attention. 
The Labour Government and South Africa, 1945-50 
The Labour victory of 1945 brought the Bureaufs Chairman, Creech Jones, to 
the Colonial Secretaryship. This was greatly welcomed by the Bureau, who now hoped to 
see Labour's Pabian-dominated colonial policy commitments put into practice. To a.- 
certain extent this was achieved, but only so far as other government priorities were 
not hampered, and for several reasons the govexnment would not adopt a policy of 
opposing South Africass racialism and desire for temitoxial eqmmion. 
llae post-wax years saw Britain at an economic crossroads, and the start of 
-the Cold War. These factors affected the Labour government's approach towds the 
Commonwealth, and especially towards South Africa, in several ways. Firstly, there were 
strong economic motives for a friendly policy towards South Africa. It was a highly 
profitable market for British investments and exports and, as a member of the sterling 
area, figured fairly substantially in financial policy. Secondly, the govement 
placed great store on the role of the Empire in Western defence, and South Africa was 
important there too. 
One must also take into account the lack of interest in ox knowledge of 
African affairs by most of the members of the government: an ignorance no doubt 
fostered, where South Africa was concerned, by General Smuts in his r81e of liberal 
world statesman. 
Meanwhile, the Dominions Office, unlike the Colonial Office, had a tradition 
as a. "white ma,nls club" and was unresponsive to criticisms of Dominion governments. 
One concern that it did have was to avoid l'interfering" in internal South African 
affairs, which it felt would encourage the anti-Commonwealth Nationalists. (8) 
, The Labour Governmentts trading and financial policies, and its enthusiasm 
for the Cold War, led it, then, to a view of South Africa very different frona that of 
the Fabians. This -was to lead to conflict on several occasions. 
1 
The Bureau@s Links with South Africa, 1945-50 
Before examining these conflicts, let us first exdne the development of 
the Fabians' links with, and their views of, South Africa between 1945 and 1950. 
While old contacts remained, new ones developed only slowly. Although the 
Fabians were a natural contact for newer activists in South Africa, such as the Rev. 
Nichael Scott, these links did not develop to any meat extent; the Fabians continued 
to insist that they could not become involved in the internal affairs of South 
Africa. ( 9 )  
There were no links with say black organizations in South Africa. At first 
sight this may seem strange, for these years saw a burgeoning of activity by Africans 
and Indians. The African organizations, however, unlike the l1white liberals" had 
neither the finances nor the organizational facilities to forge links abroad. Those 
black groups who did write to the Fabians - such as the !'Non--pean. Comitteen",o 
asked for aid in 1945 - found, like the whites, that their requests could not be 
granted. (10) 
While this approach was understa~ndable - the Bureau was frequently 
criticized by the parent Fabian Society for involving itself in too much activism at 
the expense of research (ll), and its limited personnel and finances were concentrated 
elsewhere than South Africa - it is none the less notable that the lack of contacts 
am~ng African groups in South Africa does not seem to have caused the Bureau m y  
concern. 
After 1945r however, correspondence continued with the SAIRR, and with a 
new white correspondent who was a major source of information in this period, a 
retired veterinary officer from West Africa, Donald Stewart. This future founder- 
member of the South African Liberal Party gained the wholehearted approval of the 
Bureau. A supporter of ending discrimination through a padual extension of the 
franchise, his outlook was liberal rather than socialist: socialism in South Africa 
being identified, for him, with the llwhitelq Labour Party, whose moves towards multi- 
racialism he dismissed. 
It is worth noting in parenthesis that, although Stewart does not indicate 
in his letters how he came to know of the Bureau, the Bureau was known in South Africa. 
partly through the sale th.ere of its journal, '?Ienturefs, and its policies execrated byw 
white South Africans. (12) 
Meanwhile, the Fabians, through their correspondents, became aware that 
Smutsls promises during the war years were not being fulfilled. In 1947 a Bureau 
pamphlet on south Africa was planned, and, though abandoned as Ansufficiently 
researched, it shows Fabian thinking at this time. Written by Ethe1 Biayon, a fomer 
colleague of Ballingert S then resident in England (13), it embodied a strong attack 
on African conditions before coming to the orthodox liberal solution of plans fos a 
"rational18 political economy, involving an increased domestic market for goods 
encouraged by social welfare measures, education, and the gradual extension of the 
franchise: "the future salvation of South Africa lies in extensive and mechdsed 
industrial development. For this, far more skilled and semi-skilled labour is needed 
and leading economists have stressed the view that South Africaos future as a nation 
can only be assured when the potential energy of the native population is liberated 
swd directed into the highly productive and efficient chaaaa.els of industry." (14) 
Whether such policies could ever have been implemented by a white govemellt 
is doubtful to say the least; there was, again, no consideration of the possibility 
that for some sections of capitalist enterprise, notably the mines, "cheap labourq1 
policies were eminently rational in securing profits. A few months later, however, in 
M q  1948, the Nationalists under Malan came into power. A brief piece on the issue of 
that election by the Bureau shows a gloomily realistic assessment of the position. 
While doubting Smutsls willingness to initiate reform, they mote that "The alternative 
is Dr Malanfs complete segregation and repression is likely to build up a dangerous 
volcano for the futuref1. (15) 
Thus the Fabians had come, by 1948, to a position where they had few 
illusions left about the illiberal direction of South African "native policy". After 
1948, however, any last hopes that the situation might be reformed vanished, as the 
codification of segregation under apartheid made South Africa a focal point for 
opposition to racialism worldwide. Meanwhile, Malan began to spread acquisitive 
tentacles towards the Protectprates and like-minded racialists in the Rhodesias. 
It was becoming increasingly difficult to steer clear of direct involvement with 
South Africa. 
Where the Colonial Office was concerned, the Bmeau was on the whole 
satisfied with the govementts performance, a1thcu& it was perfectly prepared to be 
critical where this was felt to be necessary. (16) Where the Dominions Office (17) 
was concerned, however, there was far less to defend, a d  far more to criticize, in 
a policy which Donald Stewart was quick to call '%ppeasementf".'. (18) 
In late 1946 Arthur Bottomley, speaking as British representative at the 
United Nations, supported South Africa's claim to incorporate South West Africa, 
after a lrrefereadum of chiefsq1 which was widely recognized as fraxdulent but which 
Britain accepted as valid. (19) Not only did the government support South Africa I 
but it had refused to allow facilities for either Chief Tshekedi Khama or Michael I 
Scott to leave BechuamIand to present the case of the Herero people of South West 
Africa. ManJr of this tribe now lived in Bechuanaland, and Tshekebi and Scott felt, l 
too, the danger of 19encirclementt1 if South Africa took full control of a territory 
which had a long comon border with the British Protectorate. i 
Contacted by Tshekedi and his legal adviser, Bucharean, the Fabians were 
prompted into activity and took up what cudgels they could on their behalf. Since 
the issue involved a British Protectorate they felt that it came within their field, 
but heated correspondence with the Domidons Office and questions in Parliament both 
failed to alter the government's position. (20) In July 1946, Hinden wrote to Tom 
Driberg, leader of the Dominions Group of Labour W s  in the Comons: "1 feel that 
it is really scandalous that when the Chief of a Protected Territory wifihes to come 
over here to put his views on a matter vitally concerning the future of his country, I 
he should be held up, and that largely b;y South African interference. %!here are one 
or two questions in the House next week on this matter, but I imagine there will be 
stone walling replies. It (21) 
Despite their lack of success, Fabian pressure tactics were not yet 
exhausted, and in November 1946 the Bureau wrote directly to Attlee, pointing: out 
that "this support to South Africa will undoubtedly have an effect on ... millions 
of Africans in British coloniestt, a;nd urging him to oppose any unilateral action to 
incorporate South-West Africa which Smuts might take in defiance of the UN. (22) 
This letter, however, was merely passed on to Addison, the Dominions Secretary, who 
replied repeating Bo.ttomleyk arguments favouring incorporation. (23) 
The Fabians continued thereafter to make representations against support 
for South Africa at the UN, but with no success. A joint depu-tation with the Quakers 
and the Anti-Slavery Society in 1949 merely produced a reiteration of the old 
arguments. (24) Fabian attempts to influence goversunent policy over South-West 
Africa had completely failed. Attempts to change government policy towards %he 
Protectorates were to he no more successful. 
As has been noted, a large element in Fabian concern with South-West Africa 
was the effect which annexation might have on Bechmland. Ever since the l92Os, 
Labour's colonial activists had been afraid that the three Protectorates might be 
transferred to South Africa; they had only a small poptilation and few natural 
resources, but were important to South Africa for mainly strategic reasons, and 
successive South Afsican Prime Ministers had campaigned for their transfer. Britain 
had alwags refused, but the possibility was always there d e r  the provisions of the 
South African constitution, and Labour activists had devoted much energy and research 
to opposing transfer and calling for the Protectorates to be made models of 
llenlightenedll colonial administration with substantial pants of aid, partly to 
provide a contrast with South African native policy. 
The clairns for lttransferll,dxopped by South Africa during the war, were 
revived after 1945 by Smuts and then Malan. The British response was to repeat the 
formula that transfer could not be effected until the African inhabitants (who were 
implacably opposed) had been consulted i n  accordance with terns l a id  dom i n  1910; 
but th i s  was done i n  conciliatory t e r n ,  sympathy was expressed f o r  Sou-th African 
aspirations, and Britain refused t o  give any undertakings as t o  where the long-term 
future of the t e r r i to r i e s  m i & t  l i e .  (25) Me=while, a v i s i t  by Gsraon-Walker, 
Dominions Under-Secretary, to  southern Africa a t  which African leaders were snubbed 
caused concern. to the Fabiansa contacts there, and anxious l e t t e r s  t o  the Bureau 
followed. (26) 
1 
i Between 1945 aYLd 1950 the Bureau followed i ts tac t ics  of l e t t e r s ,  deputations and Parliamentary questions over several matters concerning the 
Protectorates, to  the fu l l .  Direct correspontience with Attlee was again undertaken 
i n  1946 and 1947, ca l l ing  on him to  t ransfer  the responsibility f o r  the Protectorates 
t o  the Colonial Office. He replied thaA he saw no faul t  with the exist ing 
i procedures. (27) A deputation t o  the Dominions Office i n  1949 fa i led  t o  draw the desired long-term assurances against t ransfer  t o  South Africa. (28) 
l 
By 1950 the Fabians had become extremely angry as one event a f t e r  another 
appeased t o  prove the govemmentfs willingness to  bow before South African wishes. 
The disbanding of armed African troops i n  Bechuanalmd i n  1948 seemed a particularly 
disturbing example. (29) Their fa i lure  was complete, and, despite the large amount 
of blame which they l a i d  a t  the door of the Dominions Office as an imt i tu t ion ,  they 
had also fa i led  i n  appeals "over i ts  head" to  Attlee. (30) One very important 
question - the relevance of Fabian lobbying tac t ics  on issues where the govermmentfs 
p r io r i t i e s  were quite different from the i r  own - had, however, not been considered by 
them when, i n  1950, a gigantic scandal blew up i n  the Proteetorates - the Seretse XZlama 
af fa i r .  
I n  1948 Seretse Khama, he i r  t o  the major chiefdom i n  Bechua~naland, had 
offended t r i b a l  opinion by h i s  morganatic marriage to  Ruth W i l l i a m s ,  a white 
Englishwoman. The in ter rac ia l  marriage had also horrified southern African whites, 
and Malan had protested .to London. Early i n  1950 the Bri t ish government invited 
Seretse to  London f o r  talks,  and a few weelcs l a t e r  suddenly announced tha t  he would 
not be allowed back to  Bechuanaland f o r  f ive years. Although Gordon-Walker, now 
Domini.ons Secretary, denied having received communications from &lm and claimed h i s  
action had been taken t o  preserve t r i b a l  unity, no one on the l e f t  believed th is ,  asld 
Seretse himself claimed he had been tricked into coming to  England. (31) 
l The resul t  was an waprecedented uproar both inside and outside Parliament, 
which made headline news (the f i r s t  post-war African issue t o  do so). The issue 
I marked a watershed i n  public in teres t  i n  colonial a f fa i rs ,  not leant among Labour 
Party members. (32) This was so not l eas t  because the issue was the jumping-off point 
1 
j f o r  the ac t iv i t ies  of two men who were to  be very important i n  the po l i t i ca l  debates 
of the 1950s - Michael Scott, recently exiled from South Africa, and Femer Brockwqr, 
l who had been retumned as a Labour PP i n  1950. Both f e l t  (although from very different 
I po l i t i ca l  standpoints) the need f o r  a new tyye of organization t o  deal w i t h  African ! affa i rs ,  wider i n  appeal thaa the Bureau. 
1 i 
The Bureau reacted t o  Seretse's banishment with unequivocal opposition. 
Private discussions with Gordon-Walker were held, and he met a formal deputation two 
weeks la ter ,  but it was unable t o  move him. (33) Fenner Brockway, however, had 
reacted even more quickly - within a week he had organized a "Seretse mama Fighting 
Committeen",hich brollgl.lt together a variety of Bri t ish organizations i n  a pressure 
group which lobbied a t  Westminster but which also worked to  publicise the issue 
inside and outside the Labour Party. This was altogether a new approach where 
colonial a f f a i r s  were concerned, and the wide moral appeal t o  the public and t o  party 
members represented a new approach very different from the research and lobbying of 
the Fabians. It also awakened i n  the l e f t  of -the Labou Party a new in teres t  i n  
colonial affairs .  Of the rive Labom YlPs who voted against the government i n  a 
division over Seretse i n  March 1950, two (I9riberg and. Bmckway-) were left-wing 
colonial activists  who had l i t t l e  connection with the Bureau, while the Ws actively 
connected with the Fabians voted i n  accordarnce with the government whip. 
The Africa Bureau, s e t  up i n  1952 by.Eichael Scott, ljkewise advocated a 
new approach to African problems. Those involved a t  the beginning were mostly South 
African radicals who, partly %&rough disill-usion riith the Attlee govemen t~s  
performance there, advocated a non-party approach, appealing to Conservatives and 
Liberals as well as Labour politicians for economic development and poli t ical  rights 
for  Africans. Many of those involved, such as Creech Jones, were al~eafiy comec-ted 
with the Fabians, and the two co-operated througkout the 19508, especial.ly an the 
Protectorates. The approach of the Africa Bureau was similar to that of the Fabians 
i n  that i t s  instigators were "capitalists", and they engaged i n  similar tactics of 
lobbying and influencing prominent politicians, while feeling that the BureauQs 
abil i ty to lobby figures outside the Labour Party in. some ways enabled i t t o  
complement the Fabians' work i n  the Laboux Party. (34) 
Considering that af ter  l951 the Fabians wexe dealing with n Camernative 
government and with the r i se  of militant opposition to white rule throughout Africa, 
it is perhaps not surprising that they found. it hard to adapt; equally, Vne need for 
new types of or@sations -to cope with the urgent problems of the 1950s I s  not , 
surprising. The Labour Party, meanwhile, expanded i ts GamonwesX%h Departmen%, which, l 
I 
inevitably, took on some work that had folmerly been a. Fabian prer.ogati.re, I  
I 
Nevertheless, and apart from these factors, the decline i n  the Fabians' 
Wluence i n  the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  un t i l  the Bureau was merged with the Fabian- International 
Buseau i n  1963, was exacerbated by over-caution and complacewy i n  the emly 1950s, 
and a failure to adapt thei r  ideology i n  the l ight  of rapidly changing cox?&ltions 
wh5ch was, arguably, connected with the nature of vFabianismef. 
To begin with, although the Fabians worked with the Africa, Bmceau, they had 
f a r  less contact with the extremely important Movement for Colonial ITceedom which 
Brockmy~fomed i n  1954. Like the Seretse Khama Cornittee, the MCF was concerned with 
propaganda, mainly thou& not enti.rely inside the Labam Party, together with a certain 
amount of lobbying, on the platform of democratic rule everywhere i n  Africa, including 
South Africa. The Fabians regarded the PTCP as crudely dewg?-c[35),  btzt; fh2s was in-ma.ny 
respects unfair. The MCP included a nuniber of activists  - Brocbay, Dribexg, Leslie 
Hale - who were experts i n  colonial subjects. E'abian suspicion of "massn organizations 
was probably at the root of thei r  hosti l i ty to an organization which gave f a r  less 
priority to attempts to "influencen parQ leaders as such; together with the 
traditional Fabian prejudice against Marxism, the MCF was accused, rather unfairly, of 
sympathy with Communists i n  Southeast Asia. 
The potential conflict between the Fabians and P'mass" organizations i s  
revealed i n  the pamphlet "Socialists and the Empire", published in  1946. Rita Hinden, 
while making the claim of objectivity for the Fabians, revealed a t  the same time the 
particular poli t ical  bias that did exist when she wrote: "From %he s t a r t  the Bureau 
determined to work within the Fabian tradition, which has always commenced with 
research. There are too many organizations i n  a l l  spheres of public l i f e  clamouring 
for action, denouncing, appealing to  public conscience, and too few who base their  
appeals and denunciations on solid knowledge and a painstaking collection of the 
facts. (36) 
The Fabian commitment to the methods of work they had used i n  the 1940s was 
never made explicit by the Bme%u, and, complacent about thei r  successes with the 
Colonial Office, they never analysed thei r  failures a t  the Dominions Office. When the 
Seretse case blew up i n  1950 they responded with the tactics they had always used, and 
failed; but this time a "mass organizationl'in the shape of the Fighting Committee 
appeared to take up the slack. It is doubtful whether the tactics of the Committee, 
or of the MCF, were a great deal more successful in achieving their aims - but they 
did mobilize party opinion in a way impossible, not only constitutionally but, I would 
argue, ideologically as well, for the Fabians. 
The conservatism of the Bureau in the 1950s is clearly revealed in their 
relationship with South Africa, where few new contacts were developed despite the 
rapid changes in the organization of the opposition there. It is true that, unlike 
the Labour Party which increased its contact with black organizations, the Fabians 
still had very limited resources for building up new links, but there was also an 
inertia in their attitude. A striking example of this appears over the Fabian 
response to a request from the lfCommittee for a Democratic South Africat1 to help with 
fund-raising for African passive resistance, when the Secretary of the Bureau felt 
that "no responsible person will be able to sign such a letter as we should be 
supporting the opposition to the lawful government of a Dominion". (37) 
The Fabians remained a significant element in the formulation of Labourfs 
African policies throughout the 1950s - especially over Central African Federation, to 
which they became strongly opposed. By the end of the decade they had come round to 
support of rapid independence under majority d e  in Africa, abandoning the "sociaL 
engineering" and gradualism of the 1940s. (38 j But, al%ough nobody had anticipated 
the anti-colonial explosion of the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  the Fabians were, as their record on South 
Africa indicates, slower than others on the Left to develop their ideas and their 
, 
l strategies. 
An "independent" research group, the Fabian Colonial Bureau saw itself as an 
nobjective" body, but a study of its South African activities reveals that its members 
were operating with a very specific set of ideas and tactics, in regular contact only 
with like-minded groups in South Africa whose similar biases they failed to recognize. 
Their background vision of a slow reform of conditions in South Africa, through the 
development of economic and political "rationality" among the whites, begged many 
questions. As an analysis, it ignored the dependence of maqr South African industries 
on cheap black labour, and - significantly - no study of British involvement in this 
process- through trade and investment was undertaken. 
It must be added, however, that the MCF, with its calls for "freedom noww 
couched largely in moral terms, succeeded little better in mlysing South African 
society and the links, both strategic and especially economic, which prevented and 
still prevent Labour governments from challenging apartheid. The MCF, however, did 
I at least manage to avoid the Bureauls basic error; the error which Professor Popper 
l?as attributed to the classic historians: "Aiming at objectivity, they feel bound. to 
I 
avoid any selective point of view; but since this is impossible, they usually adopt 
points of view without being aware of them. This must defeat their efforts to be 
I objective, for one cannot possibly be critical of one's own point of view, aYld 
conscious of its limitations, without being aware of it. I' (39) 
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